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I. INTRODUCTION
Social networks are naturally represented by graphs: nodes correspond to participants within the network and edges (links) coincide with relationships between them. Participants of a social network typically want their sensitive information, including their relationships to the other individuals in the network, to remain private from the general public -but data miners and researchers want to analyze the raw data to discover interesting characteristics about particular social networks. Backstrom et al. showed that even if all of the identifying attributes of the participants were removed from the nodes, an adversary could still re-identify the node of a participant by exploiting auxiliary information such as nodedegree [1] . A compromise is often reached between the data publishers and the data miners, resulting in both parties agreeing to some method that will be used to anonymize a snapshot of the live network data prior to its publication.
Motivation. The majority of privacy techniques for social network data focus on a single snapshot -but one publication is not useful for mining evolving trends and patterns of social networks, such as how the popularity of individuals changes or how a disease spreads over time. To support such analysis, newer versions of social network data must be released periodically or on-demand. While multiple publications are extensively studied for relational data [5] [13] [14] , those techniques only consider the participants' structured information (i.e., their identifiers, quasi-identifiers and sensitive attributes) and assumes that such information is immutable over time. In the case of social networks, the relationships between participants are typically in flux. Consequently, those techniques cannot be safely applied to evolving social networks.
In this paper, we identify a new class of privacy attack arising from publishing a sequence of graph data for evolving social networks. At any time i, an anonymized version G * i of the raw graph G i is published, where G * i is produced by some graph anonymization method (e.g., degree k-anonymization [10] , link perturbation [9] , or k-isomorphism [6] ). Prior to each publication, the adversary can actively influence the degree of a node in G i by interacting with the social network. Such interactions may include simple friend requests in Facebook, posts on a message board, bids on Ebay, or email correspondences between different users. At time i, the adversary has access to G * 0 , · · · , G * i and tries to identify the candidate nodes for some targeted individual t by looking for those nodes that match with his knowledge about the degree of t in G 0 , · · · , G i . The attack is successful if a small number of nodes match.
At first glance, the above attack sounds straightforward and elementary -given what is known about the privacy risks regarding multiple publications of relational data [5] [13] [14] . For example, with relational data, an adversary could use quasi-identifiers to identify the anonymity groups g 1 and g 2 for a targeted individual t in two different publications, and if the only common disease between g 1 and g 2 is HIV, then it is easy to infer that t has HIV. The key assumption here is that the quasi-identifiers and sensitive attributes of an individual do not change over time. However, in social networks, we assume that edges between nodes dynamically grows over many publications. Even if the adversary knows the exact degree of t in any G i , every published graph G * i has been anonymized. For example, degree k-anonymization [10] ensures that at least k nodes share the same degree, and link perturbation [9] randomly adds and deletes links between nodes. These operations alter the neighbourhood structure of a node to make it difficult for the adversary to apply his background knowledge. The adversary is further deterred by the power law of degree distribution where many nodes share similar degrees. Under these conditions re-identifying the node of a target individual is not straightforward. Contributions. While the eventual goal is to invent methods for thwarting privacy attacks, this paper tries to answer several basic questions that are of broader importance: (1) how does the adversary re-identify the node of an individual from a sequence of anonymized graphs; (2) how to quantify the privacy risk of such re-identification; and (3) how severe and widespread are such attacks on real social networks. Our contributions are summarized as follows: 1) We identify a new type of privacy attack, which we named a degree-trail attack. We demonstrate that even if each published graph is anonymized by strong privacy preserving techniques, an adversary with little background knowledge can re-identify the node belonging to a known target individual by utilizing a sequence of published social network graphs. The adversary does not have to behave differently from a normal participant and the target node's degree can be similar to the degree of the other nodes in the graph. 2) We propose a new privacy technique, stable link randomization, which is based on link perturbation [9] but is better suited for multiple publications. 3) We present two alternative models to quantify the privacy risk of our degree-trail attack, assuming that the published graphs are anonymized by the stable link randomization. 4) We study the severity of the identified attack on real life social network data.
In the rest of the paper, Section II presents examples of degree-trail attacks; Section III formally defines the class of degree-trail attacks; Section IV presents two models of privacy risk of degree-trail attacks; Section V considers a more general class of degree-trail attacks that exploits the insertion time of nodes; Section VI presents an evaluation on the severity of the new attack using real life social network data. Section VII reviews related work and concludes the paper. Preventing degree-trail attacks goes beyond the scope of this paper.
II. EXAMPLES OF PRIVACY ATTACKS
At each publication time i, there is a live graph G i and the published graph G * i . G i evolves into G i+1 after participants add or delete nodes or edges. A fixed and unique pseudonym called a node ID is associated with the node for each individual in every G i and G * i , as assumed in [6] [17] . A node ID is not related to the actual identity of the individual, but serves to track the nodes belonging to the same individual over multiple publications. This node ID serves three purposes: (1) It simplifies our discussion of the attack; (2) it is used to extract evolving trends in social network data, and (3) it results in a stronger privacy model by assuming that the adversary can locate the nodes representing the same individual in multiple publications.
At time i, prior to the publication of G * i , any participant (including an adversary) can create new nodes and add/delete links to other nodes in G i . An adversary has access to G * 0 , G * 1 , · · · , G * i published up to time i. The adversary knows that some targeted individual is a participant of G j and knows the degree of her target in G j , for j ≤ i. The adversary's goal is to identify the node in G * i that belongs to her target. Below, we illustrate how the adversary may achieve this goal even if all published graphs G * j , j ≤ i, are anonymized by strong privacy preserving techniques. We consider two such techniques: link perturbation [8] [15] and k-isomorphism [6] .
Link perturbation. To protect the link information between two participants, Hay et al. outlined an algorithm for preventing link disclosure by introducing random noise to a graph [8] . This algorithm, link perturbation, produces G * i by randomly deleting m existing edges and randomly inserting m new edges to G i . m is calculated using a fixed perturbation rate m/|E|, where |E| is the number of existing edges in G i . The perturbation rate is publicly known. Bonchi et al. shows that link perturbation may achieve meaningful levels of identity obfuscation whilst still preserving the characteristics of the original graph [4] .
Consider the graphs G 0 and G * 0 in Figure 1 . A circle represents a node and the letter inscribed within each node is its node ID. We label the target node by t but this label is not visible to the adversary; in fact, the adversary seeks to identify t. With the background knowledge on the target's degree 2 in G 0 and the perturbation rate of 10%, the adversary infers at some confidence level that the target's observed degree in G * 0 is expected to fall into the interval [1, 3] . By inspecting G * 0 , every node has an observed degree in this interval; therefore, every node in G * 0 is a candidate for t. At time 1, the dashed circles in G 1 represent newly inserted nodes. To distance t's degree from other nodes, the adversary decides to increase her target's degree from 2 to 5 in G 1 , by creating new connections to the target individual. Assuming that t gains 1 degree elsewhere, the adversary only needs to embed two more nodes, f and g, into G 1 and attach them to her target. Given the known perturbation rate, the adversary considers any node in G * 1 with an observed degree in the interval [4, 6] to be a candidate for t. Upon inspecting G * 1 , the adversary would conclude that t and b are the candidates for her target t.
Prior to the next publication G * 2 , the adversary deletes both of her embedded nodes f and g from G 2 , so t is left with a degree of 3 and the interval [2, 4] for the observed degree of t. Once obtaining G * 2 , the adversary discovers that {a, t, d, e} have an observed degree in the interval [2, 4] . At this point, the adversary intersects this set with the previous candidate set {t, b}. Since the result contains only a single node, t, the adversary correctly identifies t as her target.
Remark 1.
(1) The adversary cannot simply identify her embedded nodes as those having new node IDs because other participants are also creating new nodes. (2) Although the adversary can embed a more identifiable subgraph, doing so will increase her chance of being detected and thus rejected. To avoid that, a better strategy for the adversary is to use embedding that is similar to the normal growth of any node; thus, each single publication may return a large set of candidates. In this case, the success of the attack relies on observing several publications. (3) The only knowledge used by the adversary is the degree of the target node and the link perturbation algorithm used (including the perturbation rate). k-isomorphism. k-isomorphism [6] produces G * i by transforming G i into k isomorphic disconnected subgraphs, g 1 , · · · , g k , through a minimum number of edge insertions and edge deletions. Consequently, for each edge (u, v) in any of these subgraphs, there will be k − 1 "isomorphic links", one in each of the other k − 1 subgraphs. This duplication creates uncertainty to associate links with target individuals. k-isomorphism implies k-automorphism [17] , which implies degree k-anonymity [10] .
k-isomorphism guards against adversaries with arbitrary neighbourhood knowledge but is defenceless against background knowledge beyond that. Suppose that the node information I(v) for each node v (such as Gender, Job, and Location) is published. To prevent re-identification of nodes using I(v), the authors of [6] suggest detaching I(v) from the node v by randomly partitioning the node set V into groups of size k and publishing {I(v 1 ), . . . , I(v k )} for each group {v 1 , · · · , v k }, therefore, breaking the linkage of the node information to each individual. Unfortunately, such grouping can defeat the purpose of k-isomorphism. For example, if the target individual is "male", any group {v 1 , · · · , v k } where {I(v 1 ), . . . , I(v k )} contains no "males" can be excluded. This refinement creates a difference amongst the k-isomorphic subgraphs, which compromises the privacy provided by kisomorphism.
In the case of multiple publications, the authors of [6] noted that the adversary could break k-isomorphism because the target node may belong to a different "k-isomorphic set" in different publications. To address this issue, they proposed to label all the k-isomorphic nodes with the compound ID formed by the set of node IDs of these nodes. For example, if u 1 , u 2 , u 3 are 3-isomorphic nodes from the 3-isomorphic subgraphs g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , all of these nodes will be labeled by the compound ID u {1,2,3} . Unfortunately, the use of compound IDs makes it impossible to track the nodes belonging to the same individual, which is essential for extracting evolving patterns of social networks.
III. DEGREE-TRAIL ATTACKS
In this section we formalize the class of attacks on a sequence of publications of social network graphs. We consider undirected, simple graphs. At time i, G i denotes the raw graph and G * i denotes the published graph. Each node in G i belongs to a participant and a link between two nodes represents a certain interaction between the two owning participants. d(v) denotes the degree of a node v in G i and d * (v) denotes the degree of a node v in G * i . G i evolves into G i+1 as a result of adding and/or deleting nodes and edges. A fixed and unique node ID is associated with the node for each individual in every G i and G * i . In section III-A, we present a technique called stable link randomization, which is better suited for multiple publications; then, in section III-B, we formalize our notion of a degree-trail attack, assuming that a published graph G * i is produced by stable link randomization.
A. Stable Link Randomization
Link perturbation [8] produces G * i from G i by randomly inserting m edges and deleting m edges. For a single publication, this ensures that an adversary cannot know with absolute certainty the degree of any node in G i based on its degree in G * i . However, because the randomization of the same link is independent in each publication, whenever a link between the same pair of nodes is observed in several consecutive publications, there is a high probability that this edge actually exists in the raw graph. Additionally, if each G i is randomized independently, the structural property (such as observed degree of a node) of G * i may be significantly different from that of G * i+1 even if G i+1 is identical to G i . This instability makes extraction of evolving patterns impossible. Finally, randomly inserting or deleting the same fixed number of m edges is not suitable for an evolving social network graph where the number of nodes and edges grows over time.
To address these issues, we propose stable link randomization for randomizing multiple versions of a graph. First, we fix the edge deletion rate ρ and edge insertion rate , instead of fixing the number of edges to be inserted and to be deleted. Therefore, an edge will be deleted with the probability ρ and kept with the probability 1 − ρ; a non-edge (i.e., an edge that does not exist in the graph) will be inserted with the probability and not inserted with the probability 1− . Importantly, these probabilities remain constant as the graph grows or shrinks.
The key idea of stable link randomization is that it reuses the randomized edges from prior publications and only performs randomization on new edges/non-edges. The reuse of randomized edges ensures that each edge will be randomized only once. Specifically, for each edge/non-edge e in G i , let e * denote its randomized decision in G * i . If e also occurs in G i+1 , we reuse e * in G * i+1 . This is possible because the deletion rate ρ and insertion rate are same in both G * i and G * i+1 and because the random trail of a link depends only on ρ, , and the link, not on any other links in the graph.
Let us describe this method in detail. We assume that G i+1 is obtained from G i by a sequence of user-initiated basic operations: edge insertion is denoted by +(u, v) and edge deletion is denoted by −(u, v), where u and v are existing nodes in G i , and node insertion is denoted by +u, where u is a new node. Deleting a node can be done by first deleting each of the edges adjacent to the node and then deleting the isolated node. For simplicity, we assume that isolated nodes are never deleted. After processing each basic operation on G i , there is a corresponding G * i . Upon the request of the (i+1)-th publication, the most recent G * i is published as G * i+1 . Below, we consider how to produce G * i after applying a single basic operation to G i .
Processing +(u, v ): First, we insert the new edge (u, v) into G i and G * i . Then, we need to perform a random deletion of the new edge (u, v) from G * i . Specifically, we toss a coin with ρ head probability and 1−ρ tail probability. If it lands heads, we delete (u, v) from G * i ; if it lands tails, we keep (u, v) in G * i . Let us denote this operation on G * i by +(u, v) * . Importantly, the new G * i inherits all edges from the old G * i . Note that (u, v) may already exist in G * i prior to performing +(u, v) * if it has been inserted by the randomization algorithm in a previous publication. In this case, +(u, v)
* always overrides the current status of
we need to perform a random insertion of (u, v) to account for the random insertion of this new nonedge. Specifically, we insert an edge (u, v) into G * i with probability and delete it with 1 − probability. Let −(u, v) * denote this operation on G * i . Again, −(u, v)
* always overrides the current status of (u, v) in G * i .
Processing +u: First, we insert the new node u into G i and G * i . This means that every vertex v = u in G i gains a new non-edge (v, u). Therefore, we need to insert some number of edges over these new non-edges into G * i following the insertion rate . Let +u * denote the set of new edges (u, v) that are randomly selected with the insertion rate . We insert all the edges in +u * into G * i .
Remark 2. Besides the privacy reason mentioned above, stable link perturbation has two other benefits due to its inheritance of randomization from the previous published graph. (1) It is more efficient than a fresh randomization of all edges in G i , especially for large and dynamic graphs. ( 2) It provides the stability on the randomized graph G * i in that G * i and G * i+1 look similar if G i and G i+1 look similar. This stability is crucial for data miners because a small change in the underlying graph should have little effect in the resulting publication.
B. Formalization of Degree-Trail Attacks
At time i, the adversary has access to all the graphs G * 0 , · · · , G * i published so far, generated by the stable link randomization method described above. The adversary also knows the edge deletion rate ρ and the edge insertion rate used by the stable link perturbation. In addition, the adversary knows that some target individual is a participant at all times j, for 0 ≤ j ≤ i. The adversary's goal is to re-identify the node t in G * i that belongs to his targeted individual. To achieve this goal, the adversary actively attaches subgraphs to and/or removes subgraphs from the target node by creating connections to and/or removing connections from the target individual in the social network application. The adversary can create a small number of nodes and attach them to the target node or remove such nodes. This operation is called embedding. To avoid being caught or rejected, the adversary is limited to using "simple" subgraphs that are similar to what would be created by a normal participant. Without loss of generality, we assume that embedding operations are performed on G j , j > 0, i.e., after observing G * 0 . We assume that an adversary has the background knowledge about the target node t's degree in G i , denoted d(t). Such an assumption was made in previous works on a single publication of graphs [6] [9] [10] [16] [17] . Even armed with this knowledge, the graph randomization process described above may alter t's degree in the anonymized graph G * i and -even if it does not -there may be many nodes in G * i with the same degree as t. So, the adversary must identify the nodes v in G * i that are likely to be the node t, by taking into account the known degree d(t), the observed degree of v in
, and the degree distortion due to the randomization process. This is done by estimating the probability that a node v with an observed degree d
If this probability is high enough, v is considered as a candidate of t at time i. The candidate set of t at time i, denoted C i (t), is the set of all candidates of t in G * i . In a single publication G * i , C i (t) may contain many candidates because many nodes in G * i have the same observed degree as t. For example, in a k-degree anonymized graph [10] , if a node has some degree, at least k − 1 other nodes will also have that degree. However, the adversary's power will be boosted by altering the degree d(t) in a sequence of graphs G j , j ≤ i, and focusing on the nodes that are candidates for all of these G * j . This is because by definition, the target node t is expected to be a candidate in every G * j with a high probability. Thus the power of the adversary is boosted by refining the set of candidates to be those contained in the intersection C 0 (t) ∩ · · · ∩ C i (t).
Definition 1: A candidate of t up to time i is a node that is a candidate at time j for all 0 ≤ j ≤ i. Thus the set of candidates of t up to time i is computed by
|C (i) (t)| denotes the number of candidates in C (i) (t). Intuitively, C (i) (t) contains all the nodes that likely have a "similar" degree to that of t in every graph G * j , j ≤ i, as inferred from the observed degree of nodes in G * j , the degree of t in G j , and the randomization algorithm used to produce G * j . To the adversary, all these nodes are possible candidates of t; therefore, without further knowledge the probability of identifying the target node is 1/|C (i) (t)|. The adversary's goal is to reduce the size |C (i) (t)| by altering the degree of t in G j by embedding nodes and attaching them to t, j ≤ i. The exact nature of "similar" depends on the model for defining the candidate set C j (t). Below, we consider this issue.
IV. TWO MODELS FOR CANDIDATES
We present two models for defining the candidate set C i (t). At time i, the adversary has access to G * i , the degree d(t) of the target node t in G i , and the edge deletion rate ρ and edge insertion rate used by the randomization process to produce G * i . The randomization may (1) add zero or more edges to t, (2) remove zero or more edges from t, or (3) add or delete an edge between two non-target nodes. (3) does not affect the degree of the target node so we will only consider (1) and (2) . Given these uncertainties, the adversary wants to identify the nodes that likely have a degree similar to d(t) in G i with a high probability. We propose two alternative models for quantifying this probability.
A. The Posterior Probability Model
The first model is based on the posterior probability that a node v has the same degree as the target node t in G i , d(t), given the node's observed degree d
If this probability is high enough, v is a candidate for t at time i, i.e., v ∈ C i (t). Without further knowledge, an adversary locates such candidates based on two things: d(t) and d * (v). The best that the adversary can infer is the likelihood that a node v in G * i has the same degree as the target node in G i , given the observed degree d * (v). This posterior probability and the notion of candidate sets based on it are defined below.
Definition 2 (Candidate set):
denote the probability that a node v has the same degree as the target in G i , i.e., d(t), based on its observed degree, d
* (v). Given a threshold λ, the candidate set of t at time i, C i (t), contains all nodes v in G *
is also the probability that t has gained
due to the stable link randomization. Therefore, this probability is closely related to answering the following question: given ρ and , how probable is it that some number of edges, say r, could be inserted into or deleted from the target node due to the stable link randomization? We refer to those probabilities as P ins (r) and P del (r) respectively. Insertions and deletions could happen simultaneously but since they are chosen from two disjoint sets of edges, P ins (r) and P del (r) are independent and can be considered separately.
Let us determine P ins (r) and P del (r). The number of nonedges associated with the target node, n(t), in a graph of N nodes is n(t) = N − d(t) − 1. Each of these non-edges have probability to be inserted. Therefore the probability that exactly r edges could be added to the target node t is equal to:
Similarly, the probability of deleting exactly r of t's edges in G * i is:
To compute
is the probability that the graph randomization has increased the degree of t by ∆(v), and
is the probability that the randomization has decreased the degree of t by ∆(v). To calculate
we must consider all possible situations that could have allowed the observed degree to increase by ∆(v): if the stable link randomization added ∆(v) + 1 edges to it, then it must have deleted 1 edge from it as well in order for that node to have a degree of d * (v); if it added ∆(v) + 2 edges to it, then it must have deleted 2 edges from it, and so on. Since stable link randomization will only delete existing edges, no more than d(t) edges could ever be removed from the target node. We have:
These computations only need d(t), d * (v), ρ, and , which are all known to the adversary. Since d(t) and d * (v) are not very large, these probabilities can be computed efficiently.
B. The Confidence Interval Model
The second model for defining C i (t) is based on some confidence interval for the observed degree of t. Given the edge deletion rate ρ and the edge insertion rate of the graph randomization, and the known degree d(t) of the target node t, we can derive the expected value of the observed degree of t and some confidence interval covering the expected value. One complication is that edge deletions and edge insertions follow different parameters, i.e., ρ and . Below, we model the effect of these operations by a sequence of Poisson trials.
Let 
According to Chernoff bound [7] , for a relative error bound δ > 0, we have
The above Chernoff bound is rewritten into
Intuitively, Equation (9) says that if G i is randomized many times, in at least θ percent of the cases the observed degree of t will fall into the interval [E(S) − δE(S), E(S) + δE(S)]. δ is the relative error, θ is the confidence level, and [E(S) − δE(S), E(S) + δE(S)] is the confidence interval. Note that δ and θ are not independent; in fact, they are related by Equations (7) and (8) . Definition 3 (Candidate set): For a given confidence level θ in (0, 1), C i (t) contains all nodes in G * i whose observed degree falls into the interval [E(S) − δE(S), E(S) + δE(S)], where E(S) is the mean of observed degree of t defined by Equation (5) and δ is defined by Equation (8).
For a given confidence level θ, the adversary can compute the confidence interval because d(t), ρ and are known. The next corollary follows from the above discussion. Corollary 4.1: Given a confidence level θ ∈ (0, 1), the probability, over all randomized graphs G * i , that C i (t) contains the target node t is at least θ, where θ is defined in Equation (7) .
From Equation (7), a larger error bound δ increases the probability that C i (t) contains the target node t, but also leads to a larger C i (t), which reduces the power of the attack. It is up to the adversary to balance between the two.
V. TIME-REFINED ATTACKS
The basic attack in Section IV ignores what the adversary can learn about the insertion time of the nodes the target must be adjacent to. In this section, we examine how the insertion time of nodes can be used for attack.
At time i, the adversary influences the degree of the target node t by inserting new nodes and attaching them to t as well as attaching existing nodes to t. Every new node inserted into G i is assigned a new node ID. Consequently, any nodes in G * i having a node ID that was not observed in any previous publications can be marked as being inserted at time i. For this reason, a course estimation of the insertion time for every new node is always known to the adversary. The next example illustrates how the adversary can use this knowledge to refine the basic degree-trail attack. For simplicity, we temporarily ignore randomization in the following example. In Figure 2 , suppose that the adversary knows that the target node t has degree 4 in G 1 , two of which come from two nodes embedded by him. With the notion of degree, both a and b are probable candidates of t and the adversary cannot differentiate between them. In the graph H 1 , nodes are partitioned according to their insertion time, where S i contains the nodes with insertion time i, where i = {0, 1}.
Since the adversary embedded two nodes to the target node in G 1 , the target node must be adjacent to at least two nodes in S 1 . This knowledge immediately allows the adversary to eliminate b as an option as it is not adjacent to any node in S 1 , leaving the adversary to conclude that a is the target node. So the next question is how could the adversary uses this observation in light of graph randomization? To answer this, we must first refine the notion of degree by insertion time.
Definition 4: Consider G i . For 0 ≤ j ≤ i, let V j be the set of nodes inserted at time j, called j-nodes, and let S j be the set of j-nodes in V j that remain in G i . The j-degree of a node v in G i refers to the number of edges adjacent to the nodes in
At time i, for 0 ≤ j ≤ i the adversary can influence d j (t) by either inserting a new edge between t and a j-node or deleting an existing edge between t and a j-node. We assume that the adversary knows the j-degree of the target node t, d j (t), which is a more elaborated form of the degree knowledge considered in the previous section. Below, we extend the notion of candidates to the case for time-refined attacks.
Definition 5:
, where E * j contains the edges in G * i between the nodes in C (i−1) (t) and the nodes in S j . H * j is the subgraph of G * i involving only the edges between the candidates in C (i−1) (t) and the nodes that were inserted at time j. Assuming that C (i−1) (t) has been computed at time i − 1, the adversary can construct H * j because S j is available. With H * j , the adversary can tell the observed j-degree of each candidate in C (i−1) (t). If a candidate v in C (i−1) (t) satisfies the adversary's expectation on the observed j-degree of t in
Based on this idea, we consider the two models separately.
In the posterior probability model,
can be computed by applying the method described in Section IV-A to the subgraph H * j . Definition 6 (The posterior probability model): For a given bound λ, the candidate set for t up to time i, C (i) (t), is the set of the nodes v in
In the confidence interval model, the expected observed j-
where q j is the number of non-edges from t to j-nodes in G i :
The candidate set of t up to time i, C (i) (t), is the set of the nodes v in
, where E j (S) is given by Equation (10).
VI. EXPERIMENT
In this section we study the extent to which degree-trail attacks succeed on real social network graphs that were anonymized using stable link randomization (Section III-A).
A. Methodologies
We considered two real life data sets, whose degree frequency are shown in Figure 3 . Dataset 1 is the e-mail network of University Rovirai Virgili (URV) with 1,132 nodes and 5,450 edges [12] . Dataset 2 is the Newman's scientific collaboration network [11] with 16,264 nodes and 47,594 edges. We started with these graphs as G 0 . First, we selected a node at random from G 0 as the target node t. Then, we generated each subsequent graph G i from G i−1 (V, E) to simulate the 1) randomly select a subset S of nodes of size c|V | from G i and add the target node t to S if it is not there. 2) add s|V | new nodes to both G i and S.
3) randomly add u|N (S)| new edges between the nodes in S to G i , where |N (S)| is the number of non-edges between nodes in S. Intuitively, S models a subset of nodes that are dynamic in the growth of their edges. S contains some existing nodes, some new nodes, and always contains the target node t. By randomly adding new edges between the nodes in S, the embedding to t is no different from the growth of other nodes in S. This ensures that the adversary does not behave differently from other nodes in S. The parameter c controls the "focus" on t, and the parameters s and u control the growth in the number of nodes and the number of edges. A small c and a large s or u will increase the probability that t will gain new edges in G i . Unless otherwise specified, we fix c at 10%, s at 1%, and u at 1%. G * i is produced from G i using the stable link randomization -with the following stipulation: since G 0 is the first graph in the sequence of raw graphs, the creation of G * 0 is identical to the traditional link perturbation [9] on G 0 except for the fact we fix the edge deletion rate ρ and edge insertion rate . Based on Hay et al.'s findings on link perturbation [8] , we fix ρ at 10%. is calculated based on the notion of deleting m existing edges from G 0 and inserting m new edges into G 0 . In other words, is set at ρ|E(G 0 )|/|N (G 0 )|, i.e., ≈ 0.859% and ≈ 0.036% for Datasets 1 and 2 respectively, where |E(G 0 )| and |N (G 0 )| denote the number of edges and the number of non-edges in G 0 .
For a given privacy degree k, an attack converges at time
. An attack succeeds at time i if it converges at time i and C (i) (t) actually contains the target node t. Unless otherwise specified, we fix k at 5. Note that the adversary knows when an attack converges but cannot tell whether an attack succeeded as he cannot verify whether t actually belongs to C (i) (t). The notion of "success" is only for our own evaluation. To reduce the result bias, we generated 10,000 distinct graph sequences G 0 , · · · , G i (and the corresponding published sequence G * 0 , · · · , G * i ) for each data set. t was randomly chosen from G 0 and fixed throughout a particular graph sequence. The success rate is defined as the percentage of the cases in which an attack succeeds, and the convergence rate is defined as the percentage of the cases in which an attack converges. Below, we examine success rate and convergence rate separately.
B. Success Rate
In the posterior probability model in Section IV-A, we use the condition P cand (d(t) | d * (v)) > λ to tell if a node v is a candidate in C i (t). We asked ourselves the following questions: (1) how does λ affect the success rate of the attack, and (2) how many publications would be required on average for an attack to succeed for a given λ? To answer these questions, we ran two experiments to assess the success rate wrt λ for the basic degree-trail attack and the time-refined attack. Figure 4 reports the success rate and Figure 5 reports the minimum number of publications required for a success.
As λ decreases, the success rate increases, assuming an unlimited number of publications. A smaller λ affects the success rate in two ways: (1) with a smaller λ it is less likely that the target node t will be wrongly discarded from C i (t).
(2) with a smaller λ, C i (t) tends to be larger and an adversary would require more publications for an attack to succeed, as shown in Figure 5 . Initially, we were concerned that setting λ too low would result in each C i (t) being too large to converge quickly on a small set of nodes. However, even when we set λ at 10 −6 , we discovered that C (0) (t) only contained ≈ 61% and ≈ 78% of the nodes from Dataset 1 and Dataset 2 respectively. The percentage of nodes in each subsequent C (i) (t) dropped sharply with each publication. These results suggest that a "conservative" approach of using a small threshold λ but examining more publications presents a more effective attack. Surprisingly, while the success rate of the posterior probability model was fairly high in Dataset 1, the success rate in Dataset 2 was far less promising. Upon investigation, it appears that many nodes in Dataset 2 share a similar low degree (Figure 3(b) ), consequently, it is harder to converge to a small candidate set that contains the target node.
Interestingly, the basic degree-trail attack has a similar success rate compared to the time-refined attack -a finding that did not match our expectation that the refined attack was more powerful. A closer look reveals that the refined attack model suffered a larger estimation error. Specifically, this attack refines the degree of a node into j-degrees according to the insertion time j of adjacent nodes and estimates the posterior probability based on j-degree. With each j-degree being small, such estimation deteriorates in accuracy. This is similar to tossing a coin only a few times, which does not give an accurate estimation of head/tail probability.
C. Convergence Rate
The remaining experiments focused on the number of publications required for convergence of attacks and the differences between the posterior probability model (PP) and the confidence interval model (CI). The probability threshold λ for PP is set to 10 −6 and the confidence level θ for CI is set to 95%. Figure 6 shows that as the edge growth rate u increases, the average number of publications (M ) required for convergence decreases. The reason for this was because as the amount of activity increased within the subset S prior to each publication, it became more likely for the target and non-target nodes to diverge in terms of degree similarity. This implies that the more active a social network is, the more likely an adversary will be able to locate her target without being detected. The number of publication required for convergence is much smaller for the larger Dataset 2 because the accuracy of both PP and IC improves as the number of random trials performed increases. Figure 7 shows the number of publications (M ) required for convergence vs different settings of privacy degree k. M did not vary considerably for values of k between 3 and 10 for each individual attack. This is not surprising since many of the publication sequences converged when the candidate set reduced from ≥ 10 nodes in G * i−1 to < 3 nodes in the final publication G * i . On the smaller Dataset 1, the refined attack requires more publications to converge than the basic attack because the larger estimation error of head/tail probability of each j-degree affects more a small graph. This result further suggests that the refined attack is not suitable for small graphs. Figure 8 illustrates the convergence rate within a certain number of publications (M ). For example, a point (6, 25%) means that in 25% of cases the attack is able to converge in ≤ 6 publications.
These empirical studies suggest two main findings: (1) a degree-trail attack succeeds frequently on real social network graphs that have been anonymized by powerful link randomization techniques. (2) An adversary may not require many publications in order to successfully attack a target within a large active social network. These findings highlight the vulnerability of privacy breaches when publishing social network graph data. We feel that our results show that there is a need for more research in this area.
VII. RELATED WORK AND CONCLUSION
Backstrom et al. were the first to propose an active attack on social networks [1] . The primary disadvantage of their attack was that no isomorphic subgraphs could exist within the live graph. Furthermore, their attack did not consider published data that was anonymized beyond the removal of identifying and quasi-identifying attributes and did not consider multiple publications. Passive attacks have been extensively studied in the literature where the adversary attacks an already published network [2] [8] [10] [16] [17] for identity disclosure, and [6] [8] for link disclosure. All those works consider a single snapshot of a static social network.
There is little work on preventing privacy attacks in the context of publishing dynamic social network data. In one such work, Bhagat et al. propose to reduce the privacy loss by predicting the growth of links and factoring such growth in a group-based anonymization approach [3] . They hide the mapping between a node and the corresponding entity called label by partitioning the set of nodes into groups of size k and assigning the label list for the group to each node in the group. However, the published graph is still vulnerable to an adversary with the auxiliary information on neighbourhood structure (such as degree). In addition, with all nodes in a group being associated with the same label list, the correspondence between the nodes in different publications is lost, rendering mining sequential patterns impossible.
Our work considered an adversary armed with auxiliary information about the degree of the target and the ability to actively influence such degrees and coordinate the attacks over multiple publications. The contribution of this work 
